350 . . . . . . and counting

"We have little intelligence on Iraq's CBW [Chemical and Biological Weapons] doctrine and know little about Iraq's CBW work since late 1998"

Joint Intelligence Committee, 21 August 2002, Butler Report, paragraph 292

"Intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes is sporadic and patchy. Iraq is also well practised in the art of deception, such as concealment and exaggeration. A complete picture of the various programmes is therefore difficult"

Joint Intelligence Committee, 9 September 2002, Butler Report, paragraph 295

"The intelligence picture they [the intelligence services] paint is one accumulated over the past four years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritative"

"For the preparation of the dossier we had a real concern not to exaggerate the intelligence that we had received. For obvious reasons, it is difficult to reflect the credibility of the information, and we rate the credibility of what we have very highly. I say no more than that"

Prime Minister's statement to Parliament on the launch of the government's dossier 24 September 2002

"What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons"

Prime Minister's foreword to the dossier "Iraq's weapons of Mass Destruction"

"I cannot bring myself to say that I misrepresented the evidence because I do not accept that I did"

Tony Blair - House of Commons October 2004

And now we know that Blair disregarded the initial advice of the Attorney General concerning the legality of an invasion. It truly beggars belief how the man sleeps at night.