"We
have little intelligence on Iraq's CBW [Chemical and Biological Weapons]
doctrine and know little about Iraq's CBW work since late 1998"
Joint
Intelligence Committee, 21 August 2002, Butler Report, paragraph 292
"Intelligence
on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes is
sporadic and patchy. Iraq is also well practised in the art of deception, such
as concealment and exaggeration. A complete picture of the various programmes
is therefore difficult"
Joint
Intelligence Committee, 9 September 2002, Butler Report, paragraph 295
"The
intelligence picture they [the intelligence services] paint is one accumulated
over the past four years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritative"
"For
the preparation of the dossier we had a real concern not to exaggerate the
intelligence that we had received. For obvious reasons, it is difficult to
reflect the credibility of the information, and we rate the credibility of what
we have very highly. I say no more than that"
Prime
Minister's statement to Parliament on the launch of the government's dossier
"What
I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam
has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons"
Prime
Minister's foreword to the dossier "Iraq's weapons of Mass
Destruction"
"I
cannot bring myself to say that I misrepresented the evidence because I do not
accept that I did"
Tony
Blair - House of Commons October 2004
And
now we know that Blair disregarded the initial advice of the Attorney General
concerning the legality of an invasion. It truly beggars belief how the man
sleeps at night.
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